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RESTRUCTURING VENEZUELA’S DEBT USING 
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ABSTRACT 
Given the depth of Venezuela’s economic crisis, many fear that the 
government and the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. 
(“PDVSA”) are on the brink of insolvency. In this paper, we introduce a 
restructuring plan that would allow Venezuela to restructure its external 
debt in an orderly manner.  We propose that Venezuela restructure both 
PDVSA debt and its own external debt via Exchange Offers. To maximize 
the number of participating bondholders and receive sufficient debt relief, 
we suggest that Venezuela primarily utilize the pari passu clauses included 
in the vast majority of PDVSA and Venezuelan bonds, which are modified 
versions of a typical pari passu clause and can be read to allow the 
subordination of the bonds in accordance with Venezuelan law. To 
minimize the number of holdout creditors, Venezuela can introduce a law 
that subordinates non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt, making timely or 
full payment of holdout debt unlikely. This tactic would minimize the need 
to rely solely on alternative restructuring techniques, such as exit consents 
and Collective Action Clauses (CACs). We argue that while these 
techniques might alone prove insufficient to successfully restructure 
Venezuela’s debt, they could supplement the restructuring options we 
propose here. Because the parties contracted for debt subordination in the 
bond contracts, we predict that using a debt subordination technique would 
be more viable in Venezuela’s case than it has been in past sovereign debt 
restructurings. Ironically, the pari passu clause that doomed Argentina 
might be what saves Venezuela. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Venezuela is in the midst of a severe political and economic crisis. 
The government and the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. (“PDVSA”), are facing imminent default on their external debt 
obligations. The risk of default has arguably increased as a result of the 
United States’ recent sanctions targeting transactions in Venezuelan debt1 
and the destabilization of crucial oil revenues from Texas caused by 
Hurricane Harvey.2  A default by either the government or PDVSA would 
be disastrous for the economy, prompting creditors to cash-strap the 
government by seizing its assets abroad. A debt restructuring of some kind 
thus seems inevitable, leading academics and practitioners to start thinking 
about a restructuring strategy.3 In this paper, we introduce a novel plan that 
would allow the Venezuelan government to restructure its external debt in a 
manner that minimizes costly litigation, improves debt sustainability, and 
gives the Republic time to deal with other pressing economic and 
humanitarian issues. 
This paper only tackles the restructuring of Venezuela’s external bond 
indebtedness (“external debt”), which amounts to approximately $65 
billion.4 We do not propose a plan for dealing with the Republic’s 
remaining External Obligations, which include bilateral loans or arbitral 
awards and collectively exceed $100 billion. The reason for the focus on 
external debt is twofold. First, external debt restructuring is more amenable 
to legal strategies, as the debt contracts are readily available and contain 
provisions that make a restructuring possible. The same cannot be said for 
other External Obligations, such as bilateral loans, as restructuring those 
would predominantly be a diplomatic rather than a legal exercise. Second, 
and more importantly, failing to restructure external debt – which is 
primarily held by powerful hedge funds – might decrease Venezuela’s 
bargaining power in “restructuring” all its other external obligations, as 
 
 1.  Ben Bartestein & Christine Jenkins, Venezuelan Bonds Get Harder to Trade Thanks to 
Sanctions Debts, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-
31/venezuelan-bonds-get-harder-to-trade-as-sanctions-spur-caution.  
 2.  Robin Wigglesworth & Gregory Meyer, Storm Harvey Adds to Headwinds for Venezuela 
Bonds, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dc547820-8d8d-11e7-9084-
d0c17942ba93. 
 3.  See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu G. Gulati, How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt (July 21, 
2017), Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2017-52, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006680 [hereinafter How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt]; Memorandum 
from Citi Research - Citigroup Global Markets “Venezuela Credit Strategy View: Estimating the 
recovery value in case of restructuring” (Aug. 8, 2017)(on file with authors).  
 4.  See Mark Walker & Richard J. Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework 3 
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039678. 
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other creditors are unlikely to be willing to effectively subsidize the full 
payment of “vulture” funds.5 
We propose that Venezuela restructure both PDVSA debt and its own 
external debt by encouraging bondholders to participate in Exchange 
Offers,6 which means that bondholders would agree to exchange their 
existing bonds for new bonds of reduced net present value (“NPV”).7 The 
success of the restructuring will be determined by the number of 
participating bondholders. Simply put, if not enough bondholders choose to 
participate by exchanging their bonds, Venezuela will not get the required 
debt relief. Minimizing the number of non-participating (“holdout”) 
creditors is thus a priority. While a sovereign has several strategic options 
to minimize holdout creditors in an exchange offer,8 we suggest that 
Venezuela use a debt subordination technique that can effectively serve the 
dual role of carrot and stick for creditors deciding whether or not to 
exchange their bonds. In this context, the technique requires the 
subordination of non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt, and we believe it 
to be the optimal strategy for encouraging broad creditor participation in 
the restructuring. Other restructuring options, such as the use of exit 
consents9 (recently proposed by Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati)10 and 
Collective Action Clauses11 (“CACs”), remain available but should be 
 
 5.  “Vulture” funds are hedge funds that specialize in buying debt of distressed sovereigns at a 
heavily discounted price and then using various methods to retrieve the debt’s full value. Vulture funds 
now likely hold increasing amounts of Venezuelan debt. See Landon Thomas Jr., Venezuelan Debt Now 
Has the Vultures Circling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/business/venezuela-debt-
investors.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Flandon-thomas-
jr.&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest
&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection&_r.  
 6.  The paper assumes that a restructuring will be attempted when sanctions, which prohibit 
transactions in Venezuelan debt (i.e. issuance of new debt), have either been removed or modified to 
allow a traditional Exchange Offer.  
 7.  The NPV reduction is necessary to lower the debt burden to a sustainable level, and it could 
come either from reducing the bonds’ principal amount or from reducing their interest rate and 
extending their maturities.   
 8.  See Lee C. Bucheit & Elena L. Daly, Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots, in SOVEREIGN 
DEBT MANAGEMENT 3, 8 (Oxford University Press ed., 2013) (explaining that a sovereign can frighten, 
deter, bind, or incentivize potential holdouts by using different legal techniques).  
 9.  “Exit consent” is a technique that allows bondholders to exchange current bonds for new ones 
and, in the process of exchanging (‘exiting’), vote via a qualified majority (usually 51% or 66.67%) to 
strip the current bonds of important non-payment protections that would then bind all remaining non-
exchanging bondholders holding those bonds.  
 10.  See generally How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5. 
 11.  CACs in bond contracts allow a supermajority (usually 75%) of bondholders to amend certain 
terms of the contract referred to as “Reserved Matters” (e.g. payment terms), binding all bondholders. 
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viewed as second-best options. As we explain, our strategy fills important 
gaps that other proposals have not addressed. For this reason, those other 
options should be viewed as supplementary techniques rather than primary 
restructuring mechanisms. 
To use the debt subordination technique effectively, we recommend 
that Venezuela utilize the pari passu provisions included in approximately 
90% of PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s bonds that can be read to allow for 
subordination of those bonds by Venezuelan law. A typical pari passu 
provision has been traditionally understood to protect creditors against 
legal subordination of outstanding unsecured debt.12 This means that a 
debtor cannot treat existing or future unsecured debt as legally senior to 
any existing debt that includes the typical pari passu provision.13 The 
infamous pari passu provision in Argentina’s bonds was effectively a 
longer variant of this “typical” provision.14 But New York courts in the 
Argentine litigation interpreted pari passu as protecting creditors from both 
legal subordination of their bonds and from non-ratable payment (de facto 
subordination) in the event of a default.15 This meant that a defaulting 
sovereign, such as Argentina, could neither legally subordinate existing 
debt, nor practically pay one creditor (i.e. exchanging bondholder) without 
concurrently paying another (i.e. holdout). The “ratable payments” 
interpretation therefore inhibits sovereign restructurings by severely 
discouraging creditor participation in Exchange Offers, since a rational 
creditor would choose to hold out and receive full payment rather than 
exchange and receive reduced payment. While more recent New York 
District Court decisions have arguably weakened this novel interpretation,16 
 
The difference with ‘exit consents’ is that the latter requires a smaller qualified majority to amend 
contractual terms, and the amendable terms are the non-payment terms.  
 12.  Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 
53 EMORY L.J. 869, 911–12 (2004). The Latin term pari passu literally translates to “in equal step” and 
a typical pari passu provision would state that “the Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of 
payment with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the 
Issuer.” Id. at 871.  
 13.  Legal seniority of debt means that one creditor has a more senior legal right to payment than 
other creditors in the event of a default.  
 14.  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The 
Securities [bonds] will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of 
the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The 
payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all 
its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness”)  
 15.  It was specifically the second part of the Argentine clause that gave rise to the “ratable 
payments” interpretation. 
 16.  See White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, No. 16-cv-1042, 2016 WL 7441699 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016); Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, No. 17-CV-1530, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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there is still a risk that Venezuela’s pari passu clauses might be interpreted 
in line with Argentina’s. For this reason, many experts suggest that 
architects of Venezuela’s restructuring should use legal mechanisms to 
remove pari passu clauses from the bond contracts governing the 
restructuring in order to remove this risk.17 
In contrast with experts that would remove pari passu clauses, we 
believe that the pari passu clause should be retained in both PDVSA and 
Venezuela bonds. In fact, we argue that Venezuela could and should use its 
pari passu provisions as a powerful tool against holdouts. This is because 
both the PDVSA and Venezuela pari passu provisions have been modified 
from a “typical” (e.g. Argentinian) clause, in a way that would arguably 
facilitate rather than impede Venezuela’s restructuring efforts. The 
modified versions, copied in full in Part II (A) and Part III, include a 
qualification that seems to expressly allow existing debt obligations to be 
subordinated vis-à-vis other obligations identified by Venezuelan law. 
Thus, we suggest that Venezuela enact – or threaten to enact – a law that 
identifies exchanged debt as an obligation that would enjoy priority status 
vis-à-vis non-exchanged debt. This would offer bondholders a “carrot” in 
the form of priority payment if they choose to exchange, and a “stick” in 
the form of subordinated payment (which might effectively mean non-
payment) if they choose to holdout. 
It should be noted that this technique is not without risks. The 
particular pari passu language in Venezuela’s bonds has never been tested 
in court. Further, the debt subordination would have to be retroactive in 
order to work, which could potentially give rise to claims of expropriation. 
Nevertheless, we find that New York contract interpretation principles, 
coupled with evidence from bond market pricing, support our interpretation 
of the modified clause. Also, Venezuela has plausible defenses to counter 
any claims of retroactive expropriation. Importantly, the success of this 
plan does not depend on the actual ability of the current or future 
 
122659 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2, 2017). These decisions are not yet precedential, but are likely to be 
persuasive in any future adjudication by a New York court. According to the court in these cases, mere 
non-payment of bondholders, without some other “extraordinary act” by the debtor, was not sufficient 
to constitute contractual breach of the pari passu provision. In other words, the court tried to limit the 
“ratable payments” interpretation of the pari passu provision endorsed by the court in NML v. 
Argentina. According to the court, an example of an “extraordinary act” would be Argentina’s passing 
of the “Lock Law,” which effectively prohibited any and all future payments to holdouts.  
 17.  See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7; Walker & Cooper, supra note 6, 
at 25; Ricardo Haussman & Mark Walker, Restructuring Debt in the Dark, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct. 
6, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-perils-for-venezuela-by-
ricardo-hausmann-and-mark-walker-2-2016-10?barrier=accessreg [hereinafter Restructuring Debt in 
the Dark]. 
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government to formally adopt the suggested law; it suffices if creditors 
merely perceive the government as willing and able to pass the legislation 
at any point in time. 
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I assesses the key challenges 
to restructuring Venezuelan debt and argues that these challenges can be 
mitigated.  Part II and Part III explain our specific proposals for 
restructuring PDVSA and Venezuelan debt, respectively, and discuss the 
anticipated legal risks associated with each. 
II. VENEZUELA’S RESTRUCTURING: NECESSARY, COMPLEX, 
BUT FEASIBLE 
Information on the economic conditions in Venezuela is limited and 
often inconsistent.18 The only certainty is that the Venezuelan economy has 
taken a significant hit from the global decrease in the price of oil. While the 
crisis was precipitated by an oil price decrease, however, the crisis is 
neither wholly exogenous nor temporary. In other words, this is not a 
liquidity crisis.19 To the contrary, the crisis is arguably structural because it 
is linked to the unproductivity of the oil sector, and to the economic 
distortions created by domestic price and currency controls.20 It is for these 
reasons that markets have perceived the Venezuelan economy and PDVSA 
to be on the brink of insolvency, and a restructuring appears inevitable.21 
Restructuring Venezuela’s external debt would be a particularly 
complex endeavor. Thus, we must account for several potential challenges 
to the restructuring. These include (1) the heterogeneity of the debt 
structure; (2) the fact that most of the external debt is likely held by 
creditors who, in light of the outcome of the NML v. Argentina litigation,22 
may have a higher propensity to hold out and litigate rather than 
 
 18.  For instance, inflation rates and other key economic variables are reported differently in 
different sources.  
 19.  Dany Bahar & Sebastian Strauss, The Future of Venezuela: Are Reforms Enough to 
Guarantee Solvency? THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2016/11/02/the-future-of-venezuela-are-reforms-enough-to-guarantee-solvency/.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  According to recent data, the probability of default by PDVSA over the next 12 months is 
92.7% (up from 50% in April). Ralph Cope, Venezuela Default Probability Reaches Record in 
Bloomberg Model, BLOOMBERG: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/venezuelan-default-probability-reaches-record-
bloomberg-model. The probability of a credit event for Venezuela or PDVSA over the next 5 years is 
99%. Ben Bartenstein, White House Sanctions May Scare-Off Venezuela Vulture Investors, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-28/white-
house-sanctions-may-scare-off-venezuela-vulture-investors.  
 22.  See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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restructure; and (3) the fact that Venezuela has extensive contracts and 
assets abroad that could potentially be seized by holdout creditors who 
might still be entitled to full payment after restructuring efforts have 
concluded. 
First, the overarching challenge is that the legal structure of the debt is 
heterogeneous, as the legal terms relevant to restructuring vary across 
PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s bonds. Specifically, PDVSA debt 
(approximately $27 billion)23 is issued under a trust indenture and does not 
contain any CACs that would allow modification of some key terms of the 
indenture (“Reserved Matters,” such as payment terms) by a bondholder 
supermajority. Amendments to those matters instead require unanimous 
consent. Venezuela’s debt (totaling approximately $37 billion),24 on the 
other hand, is divided into three categories with respect to CACs: (1) pre–
2003 issued debt that contains no CACs and thus requires unanimous 
consent for amendments to “Reserved Matters”, (2) 2003–2004 issued debt, 
with an 85% threshold for amendments, and (3) post-2004 issued debt with 
a 75% threshold to amend “Reserved Matters”. In addition, PDVSA bonds 
require a simple majority to amend non-Reserved Matters, while Venezuela 
debt requires a 66.67% majority to make such amendments. Importantly, 
these voting thresholds need to be reached on a series-by-series basis (i.e. 
reached on each series of issued debt) rather than on an aggregate basis (i.e. 
reached by tallying the votes of all debt-holders). 
A second challenge, which is unique to restructuring Venezuela’s 
bonds containing CACs, and has been overlooked by some 
commentators,25 is that even amendments to certain non-payment terms 
require a qualified 75% or 85% supermajority. Such terms include: 
sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, governing law, and place of payment. In 
other words, the scope of the “Reserved Matters” has been extended in 
Venezuela CAC bonds to include several important terms beyond the 
payment terms. This may restrict the scope of exit consent use – a 
technique that, as explained, allows a qualified majority of bondholders to 
amend certain non-payment terms in the bonds upon deciding to exchange 
them, binding all remaining non-exchanging bondholders. Therefore, 
Venezuela’s restructuring is challenging because of non-uniformity in both 
the voting thresholds across the bonds needed for amendments, and the 
terms that these voting thresholds can amend. This debt heterogeneity 
 
 23.  Walker & Cooper, supra note 6, at 3. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 25. 
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means that one might be unable to approach the entirety of the debt with a 
one-size-fits-all restructuring strategy. 
But more generally, relying on reaching particular majority thresholds 
to effectuate a restructuring is problematic whenever holdout creditors are 
able to buy additional outstanding debt to prevent the majority threshold 
from being reached (i.e. become holders of at least 26% of a debt series to 
prevent a 75% CAC).  Holdout buying of such “blocking” positions can 
effectively prevent the use of any threshold-based restructuring strategy. 
This problem is particularly acute when CACs and exit consents operate on 
a series-by-series rather than aggregate basis, as it is relatively cheaper for 
a holdout to buy a blocking position. 
Third, the fact that Venezuela has extensive assets abroad presents a 
distinct challenge. Holdout bondholders may try to convince a court that, 
even though they chose not to exchange, they still have an enforceable right 
to full payment under their existing bonds. Venezuela’s foreign assets 
would be the number one potential source of such payment, and any 
restructuring technique that leaves holdout creditors entitled to timely and 
full payment gives rise to ownership claims over those assets. 
While each of these three challenges make a restructuring 
complicated, they are certainly not debilitating. Both PDVSA and 
Venezuelan debt contain modified pari passu provisions that can be read to 
permit changes in the ranking of payment obligations via Venezuelan 
legislation. Using pari passu could significantly mitigate the above 
challenges in at least three ways. 
First, while the debt is otherwise heterogeneous with regard to 
contract terms, the same pari passu provision is included in all PDVSA 
bonds and in the vast majority of Venezuela bonds (all Venezuelan bonds 
except for non-CAC bonds). Successfully using our pari passu-based 
subordination strategy could therefore help restructure most of Venezuela’s 
external debt (approximately 90%), and would require deferring to other 
techniques to restructure only a minority (approximately 10%) of 
outstanding debt.26 Second, this technique virtually entirely avoids the 
challenge presented by holdouts buying blocking positions. While holdouts 
would only have to buy a fraction of PDVSA or Venezuelan debt in order 
to block the application of exit consents or CACs, they would have to buy 
100% of the entire debt to avoid the subordination of their claims under our 
 
 26.  The outstanding debt amounts to approximately $64 billion. Non-CAC debt amounts to 
approximately $6 billion. As only non-CAC debt does not contain the modified pari passu provision, 
this means that the provision can be used to restructure approximately 90% of the outstanding external 
debt.  
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approach. The fact that it only takes a few creditors of any debt-series 
exchanging their bonds to subordinate the claims of all holdouts makes the 
subordination approach particularly appealing. Third, the fact that non-
exchanged debt could be subordinated to exchanged debt under Venezuelan 
law means that holdouts would no longer have a residual right to payment 
equal to that of exchanging bondholders. Therefore, they would not have an 
immediate right to any Venezuelan and/or PDVSA assets given that their 
right to payment would be secondary to the payment right of exchanging 
bondholders. Therefore, until all exchanging bondholders are paid, foreign 
assets would be safe from destabilizing holdout seizures. 
In attempting to use the pari passu provision in its favor, Venezuela 
may benefit from the precedent established by Argentina’s debt 
restructuring adjudication in NML v. Argentina27 in at least two ways. First, 
even though the language of the pari passu provision in Venezuela’s bonds 
is different than in Argentina’s, the court’s interpretation of the clause is 
beneficial to our approach.  In NML v. Argentina, the court focused on the 
specific contractual language and concluded that all parts of the clause 
should be given effect whenever possible.28 This is of paramount 
importance because, as explained, the clauses at issue here include a 
qualification that the debt can be subordinated according to Venezuelan 
law. Under the NML v. Argentina interpretative precedent, this 
qualification is a part of the clause that cannot be disregarded and must be 
given effect. Second, Argentina’s holdout creditors convinced the court to 
adopt their “ratable payments” interpretation of the clause. In other words, 
Argentina’s holdouts persuaded the court that they had read the clause and 
understood it as ensuring “ratable payments” when buying Argentina’s 
debt. Given that the sovereign debt market has relatively few, but repeat, 
players, Venezuela’s potential holdout creditors may reasonably overlap 
with Argentina’s. In that case, it would be difficult for Venezuela’s holdout 
creditors to argue that they did not contract with Venezuela with the 
particular modified clause in mind, since they had so carefully 
contemplated the meaning of the clause in Argentina’s bonds. Similarly, 
Venezuela would have a strong case that the creditors must have taken the 
clause into account when purchasing the bonds and, as a result, the clause 
simply allocates the risk of debt subordination to creditors. 
 
 27.  Argentina’s famous debt restructuring litigation spanned a period of over 10 years, after the 
country defaulted on its debt in 2001 and attempted to restructure in 2005 and 2010. See generally Lee 
C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, Cap. Mkts. L. J. vol 
12, no. 2, 224.  
 28.  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 669 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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More recent court decisions on debt restructuring may also be 
beneficial for Venezuela. Specifically, the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt., Corp. extended the scope of 
the use of exit consents,29 providing debtors in distress like Venezuela 
greater flexibility in utilizing this technique when needed. Thus, while 
using exit consents might not be effective as a primary strategy, this leaves 
room for their use as a supplementary option. 
Having discussed some important ways in which Venezuela could 
mitigate the challenges in restructuring its debt, we now proceed with our 
specific proposals for restructuring PDVSA and Venezuelan debt. 
III. PDVSA DEBT RESTRUCTURING: SUBORDINATION OF NON-
EXCHANGED DEBT 
A. Applicable Contractual Provisions 
PDVSA bonds are notable for the general uniformity of their key 
provisions. Specifically, all PDVSA bonds lack CACs, include a simple 
majority threshold for amending non-payment terms, and incorporate a pari 
passu provision that states: 
The Notes and the Guaranty will be the unsecured, senior obligations of 
the Issuer and the Guarantor and will rank pari passu with all other 
senior unsecured obligations of the Issuer and the Guarantor, in each 
case other than obligations granted preferential treatment pursuant to 
the laws of Venezuela.30 
In addition, the “Risk Factors Relating to the Notes” restate the 
provision: 
The Notes will be our senior unsecured obligations. The payment of 
principal and interest on the Notes will be effectively subordinated in 
right of payment to all of our secured indebtedness and to creditors given 
a statutory priority under applicable law . . . .31 
B. Strategic Use of Pari Passu 
The pari passu provision in the bonds leaves open the opportunity to 
use Venezuelan law in the restructuring. In our view, use of this provision 
may suffice to instill a credible fear among potential holdouts that if they 
do not participate in a restructuring and tender their bonds, their bonds will 
be subordinated and they may be left virtually unpaid. Importantly, if this 
 
 29.  See generally Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 
2017).  
 30.  Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022 (emphasis added). 
 31.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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fear is viewed as legitimate in a post-NML v. Argentina paradigm, 
PDVSA/Venezuela may not need other costly means of incentivizing 
creditors to effectuate a restructuring, such as stripping PDVSA of its right 
to exploit oil,32 or forcing PDVSA into bankruptcy.33 Moreover, PDVSA 
would not need to aggressively use exit consents to achieve a successful 
restructuring.34 
In fact, solely using exit consents may prove insufficient for two 
reasons. First, and most importantly, the technique can be blocked if 
holdouts purchase 51% of any debt series, which is the majority threshold 
needed for using an exit consent strategy. Second, the technique might not 
guard against the possibility of holdouts seizing PDVSA assets. As 
discussed in Part I, holdouts could attempt to seize PDVSA/Venezuelan 
assets as a means of receiving full and timely payment. This is likely 
because, absent our legislative debt subordination solution, holdouts would 
still have a right to payment equal to that of exchanging bondholders – 
since exchanged notes would not qualify as “obligations granted 
preferential treatment according to the laws of Venezuela.”35 Exit consents 
alone are unlikely to mitigate this problem because an exit consent strategy 
may not be used to remove the pari passu clause, which, without legislative 
intervention, ensures the debts’ equal ranking. The terms of the bonds 
would likely prohibit the removal of the clause without unanimous 
bondholder consent.36 The only exit consent use that could be effective in 
minimizing the risk of asset-seizures is one that would allow a majority of 
bondholders to change the notes’ “Obligor;” a suggestion set forth by Lee 
Buchheit and Mitu Gulati.37 Changing the Obligor (the entity carrying the 
obligation to pay the debt) from PDVSA to a new entity means that any 
holdout can only pursue the new entity’s assets for recovery. While this 
 
 32.  See Restructuring Debt in the Dark, supra note 19. Asset stripping can however be seen as a 
way for the government to “intentionally bleed” the company for governmental gain, which creditors 
can use to pierce the veil between the government and PDVSA and seize Venezuelan assets.  
 33.  See generally Walker & Cooper, supra note 6 (detailing this bankruptcy proposal).  
 34.  A few experts have advocated for this approach. See e.g., How to Restructure Venezuelan 
Debt, supra note 5; Walker & Cooper, supra note 6. 
 35.  Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022.  
 36.  PDVSA bonds state in relevant part that “no amendment may subordinate the Notes in right 
of payment to any other Indebtedness of the Issuer” and “no amendment may impair the right of each 
Holder to receive payment of principal of, premium, if any, interest and Additional Amounts if any, on 
such Note on or after the due date thereof . . .” See, e.g., id. at 111. Using exit consents to remove the 
clause entirely would likely be in breach of at least the second of the two above provisions.  
 37.  See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7–11.  
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technique would likely be effective in containing the asset-seizure risk,38 it 
can do nothing to address the risk of holdouts buying a controlling position 
and blocking the application of the technique altogether. Invoking the pari 
passu provision and proceeding with a debt subordination strategy may 
therefore prove invaluable, if not necessary, for PDVSA’s successful 
restructuring. 
To make the provision work in Venezuela’s favor, the Venezuelan 
government could pass a statute that subordinates non-exchanged debt to 
exchanged debt. In other words, exchanging creditors would receive 
statutory priority and preferential treatment (vis-à-vis potential holdouts) 
under Venezuelan law. Venezuela could announce the new law either 
before or after an Exchange Offer has been announced. If introduced before 
an Exchange Offer, the law would ensure that in the case of a future debt 
restructuring (1) initiated by the state (or state-owned entities) (2) with 
regards to specific debt series, and (3) executed via Exchange Offers, non-
exchanged external debt would be subordinated to exchanged debt. 
Creditors would therefore be entering the exchange negotiations with the 
law already in place. If introduced when an Exchange Offer is already 
underway, the law may not have to be formally enacted at all, as long as the 
Exchange Offer prospectus clearly articulates the possibility of the 
legislative subordination of non-exchanged debt.39 We believe it is 
preferable to commence an Exchange Offer before introducing a statute 
regarding debt subordination. Enacting a law before the commencement of 
an Exchange Offer may simply lead bondholders to sell their bonds to 
vulture funds that are more likely to hold out and resort to litigation rather 
than exchange. Regardless of the relative timing of the statute’s potential 
enactment and Exchange Offer, however, the fear of non-payment to 
holdouts would be credible. The cautionary language in the Exchange Offer 
prospectus could hypothetically read as follows: 
PDVSA does not foresee that it will have the resources to pay non-
Exchanged Notes under their existing terms. In addition, and as 
explicitly provided in the terms of the existing Notes, the Exchanged 
Notes may be given statutory priority and enjoy preferential treatment in 
right of payment vis-à-vis Non-Exchanged Notes according to 
Venezuelan legislation. 
 
 38.  This assumes that the new entity is structured in a way that legally and effectively separates it 
from PDVSA. Otherwise, creditors of this new company may attempt to seize PDVSA assets by 
“piercing the corporate veil,” convincing a court that PDVSA and the new entity are not sufficiently 
distinct to warrant legal separation of obligations.  
 39.  This possibility would be introduced as a risk in a hypothetical bond prospectus section titled 
“Risks of Not Participating in the Offer.” 
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This language sufficiently warns that non-exchanged notes may 
remain in default, but also leaves room for PDVSA and Venezuela to pay 
holdouts if the holdouts are few enough that paying them would be more 
cost-effective than litigating against them. 
We must note that the success of this plan does not depend on the 
ability of the current or any future government to formally pass the 
required law. It will certainly suffice if creditors merely perceive the 
government as willing and able to pass the legislation at any given point in 
time. 
C. Additional Incentives to Participate: “Carrots and Sticks” 
If PDVSA does not think that threatening to subordinate holdout debt 
alone would be sufficient to maximize creditor participation, it can proceed 
with the following supplementary options. 
First, PDVSA could incentivize bondholders to accept the new bonds 
issued in the Exchange Offer by making them contractually attractive. For 
example, one such incentive could be the inclusion of a typical pari passu 
provision instead of a modified one, which would exclude the possibility of 
subordination according to Venezuelan law and make those new bonds 
harder to restructure. Another monetary incentive would be the inclusion of 
oil warrants in the new bonds that would guarantee payment to bondholders 
(in addition to coupons) if and when the oil market rebounds. 
Second, PDVSA could utilize exit consents. This means that, as a 
condition for exchanging their bonds, 51% of bondholders would have to 
consent to amending certain non-payment terms of the old bonds when they 
exchange them. To the extent that these terms are sufficiently valuable, 
bondholders would rather hold new bonds of reduced NPV instead of old 
bonds of full value but amended contractual terms. One term that has been 
suggested as amenable to change is that of the Obligor, as mentioned 
earlier. Indeed, Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati suggest that delegating the 
debt obligations of PDVSA to a new and less trustworthy entity is 
contractually permissible and the best use of the exit consent strategy in 
this context.40 Another term that could be changed is the place of payment. 
Changing the place of payment from New York to Venezuela would induce 
potential holdouts to exchange because Venezuela currently has strict 
capital controls that would make it harder for would-be-holdouts to 
expatriate their bond payments. 
 
 40.  See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7. 
FAYYAD PUBLICATION VERSION(DO NOT DELETE) 12/8/2017  9:44 AM 
2017] RESTRUCTURING VENEZUELA’S DEBT USING PARI PASSU 199 
 
But as noted, an exit consent strategy would ideally come after a debt 
subordination strategy, and only if necessary. We find it likely that exit 
consents would not be needed if the subordination of the bonds were to be 
considered legally viable at the time of the Exchange Offer. In the past, 
bond subordination threats have successfully worked to incentivize 
bondholders to exchange their bonds. For instance, Argentina did not use 
exit consents in its debt restructuring. Instead, Argentina passed the “Lock 
Law,” a variant of our contemplated Venezuelan law, halting payments to 
non-exchanging bondholders. As a result of the law, 93% of bondholders 
chose to exchange. Since the contemplated use of a similar law here is 
more legitimate than in the case of Argentina – as the possibility of such 
law being passed is implicitly recognized in PDVSA bonds’ pari passu 
provision – we anticipate that the level of creditor participation could 
match or exceed that of Argentina, thus minimizing the need for additional 
restructuring techniques. 
D. Legal Risks, Challenges, and Defenses 
Our restructuring proposal is not risk-free. Potential holdouts could 
bring legal challenges to the recommended subordination technique. These 
challenges would likely relate primarily to the proper interpretation and use 
of the pari passu provision, as well as to the retroactivity of subordination. 
We explain, however, why these challenges are surmountable. Further, we 
defend against challenges to the use of exit consents as described above. 
1. Interpretation of Contractual Language 
Our proposal risks having holdouts challenge Venezuela’s 
interpretation and use of the modified pari passu provision. Holdouts could 
argue that Venezuela’s interpretation is inconsistent with the original intent 
of the contracting parties and it should therefore be disregarded. In 
particular, they would try to argue that (1) the qualifying language included 
in the pari passu provision is either boilerplate language or a drafting error 
that does not reflect contractual intent; or (2) there are alternative 
interpretations that are more “creditor friendly” and do not allow non-
exchanged debt to be subordinated to exchanged debt. Regardless of the 
strategy holdouts choose to use to try to discredit Venezuela’s 
interpretation, we believe that New York contract interpretation principles 
weigh in favor of Venezuela. 
As a threshold matter, there is no case law or treatise interpreting this 
particular variant of the pari passu provision in a sovereign debt contract. 
While the fact that this particular language has not been tested in court is a 
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risk, it also means that our proposition is doctrinally possible. In fact, 
prominent academics believe that similar language supplementing other 
pari passu provisions entitles a sovereign to “forbid payment to holdout 
creditors.”41 But what is more important is that the parties to the contract 
are sophisticated, are likely repeat players in the market, and have agreed to 
the negotiated terms of the debt contract. The pari passu language itself 
makes clear that (1) there are PDVSA obligations that (2) can be given 
preferential treatment in terms of ranking (3) by Venezuela’s laws. These 
“obligations” reasonably include debt obligations, which must also be 
“senior” and “unsecured” (e.g. new exchanged notes). 
When dealing with sophisticated parties and explicit contractual 
language, New York courts overwhelmingly give deference to the 
contractual language as the best indicator of intent.42 Therefore, the 
inclusion of the qualification should not be disregarded as “boilerplate” or 
“a drafting error,” but instead viewed as a risk allocation mechanism 
whereby bondholders bear the risk of having their debt subordinated to 
other Venezuelan obligations, including exchanged debt. The fact that the 
provision appeared in several parts of the offering document further 
reinforces the argument that bondholders assumed the risk of subordination 
after receiving sufficient disclosure. 
In addition, if holdouts argue that the provision should be given a 
meaning different than Venezuela asserts, they would have to offer 
alternative interpretations for the kind of obligations that can receive 
legislative preference (in lieu of exchanged debt). The holdout would have 
to find an example of an obligation that would fall under the provision and 
be a “senior unsecured obligation of the issuer,” as the pari passu 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Stephen Choi et. al., Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random 
Mutation? 9–10 (NYU Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-34, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827189. The authors argue that a “Mandatory Law” exception in pari 
passu clauses subjects the clause to application of mandatory local law, and allows a sovereign to 
change its local law to forbid the payment to holdout creditors.  
 42.  See, e.g., Ashwood Capital, Inc. v. OTG Mgt., Inc., 99 A.D.3d 1, 7 (2012) (“According to 
well-established rules of contract interpretation, ‘when parties set down their agreement in a clear, 
complete document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its terms’. We apply this 
rule with even greater force in commercial contracts negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated, 
counseled businesspeople . . . We . . . concern ourselves ‘with what the parties intended, but only to the 
extent that they evidenced what they intended by what they wrote’.”); Syncora Guar. Inc. v. EMC 
Mortg. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 3106 (S.D.N.Y., June 19, 2012) (citing British Int’l. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros 
La Republica, S.A., 342 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“When interpreting a written contract, the Court 
seeks ‘to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language they have 
employed.’”); Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 313 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“When interpreting a contract [under New York law], the ‘intention of the parties should control, 
and the best evidence of intent is the contract itself’”). 
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qualification only applies toward such obligations.43 Even more 
challenging than offering a list of plausible alternative obligations, 
however, would be to argue that the list is exhaustive and excludes 
exchanged debt as an obligation that could receive statutory priority. 
Holdouts could counter-argue that if the contract gave Venezuela the 
power to subordinate holdout debt, the risk would be reflected in the price 
of the bonds. However, in the case of PDVSA, empirical price observations 
may prove inconclusive. PDVSA bonds contain many legal terms that 
could have been priced into the contract. If, for instance, one expected the 
pari passu provision to make the bonds tradable at a discount, that price 
effect could have been counteracted by the fact that the bonds require 
unanimous consent to amend payment and other terms. The latter makes 
the bonds “safer” for investors and would, all other things being equal, 
make them trade at a premium. Any price effect of the pari passu provision 
would thus be nullified. To properly isolate the price effect of pari passu, 
an econometric analysis would have to control for every other legal term. 
That would require a large data set of PDVSA bonds that differ in their 
legal terms. But, as previously mentioned, PDVSA bonds are uniform in 
their legal structure, thus making empirical analyses difficult to conduct. 
A further risk is that holdouts could draw a parallel between 
Venezuela’s law and Argentina’s “Lock Law.” In the latter case, the law 
effectively halted payments to all holdout creditors and was found to be in 
breach of the Argentine pari passu provision. The law was ultimately 
considered such an extraordinary and unwarranted measure that it justified 
an injunction by New York federal courts to induce full payment of holdout 
creditors. However, this would be a contextually false analogy. Put simply, 
Argentina’s pari passu provision – unlike PDVSA/Venezuela’s – did not 
include a qualification that all external debt ranks pari passu unless some 
obligations are granted preferential treatment by legislation. Thus, while 
Venezuela’s law may resemble Argentina’s, unlike Argentina, the law in 
Venezuela’s case is wholly consistent with the pari passu language. 
A third, albeit smaller, risk is a potential holdout argument that 
Venezuela breached an implied “duty of good faith” by using local law to 
subordinate non-exchanged debt, essentially coercing bondholders to 
exchange their bonds. But the fact that the pari passu provision contained a 
qualification regarding the applicability of Venezuelan law weakens such 
arguments. U.S. contract law (and New York law in particular) has 
 
 43.  Recall that the provision states the “notes rank pari passu with all other senior unsecured 
obligations. . .other than [senior unsecured] obligations granted preferential treatment . . .” See 
Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022.  
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generally held that a good faith duty cannot provide bondholders with 
rights inconsistent with a bond’s express terms.44 Generally, when the 
issuer acts according to a bond’s express provisions, good faith claims are 
unavailable.45 Given the unavailability of a good faith argument, holdouts 
cannot easily raise claims of coercion either, at least not the type of 
coercion that a court would likely find unacceptable.46 
2. Retroactive Subordination and Expropriation 
Additional challenges to the proposed subordination technique may 
stem from its retroactive nature. Venezuela did not have a law at the time 
of issuance stipulating that future exchanged debt would enjoy statutory 
priority. Retroactive application of law could give rise to claims of 
expropriation.47 But Venezuela can raise three defenses. 
First, mere subordination of non-exchanged debt most likely does not 
constitute expropriation. Bondholders would theoretically receive their 
payment as resources become available in the case of default. This is not 
the same as a situation in which bondholders are told explicitly that they 
will never receive any payment – as was the case in Argentina – and see 
their property rights virtually extinguished. An expropriation claim also has 
to show that expropriation was discriminatory (here, as against foreign 
bondholders). Here, all non-exchanging bondholders will be treated the 
same, whether they are Venezuelan residents or foreigners, so there is no 
evidence of discrimination. 
Second, if expropriation were found to have occurred, Venezuela 
could use the state action doctrine as a defense. The state action doctrine 
provides that U.S. courts “[w]ill not judge the validity of official acts of a 
 
 44. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In 
contracts like bond indentures, an implied covenant [of good faith] . . . derives its substance directly 
from the language of the indenture and cannot give Bondholders any rights inconsistent with those set 
out in the indenture.”). 
 45.  See William Bratton & Adam Levitin, The New Bond Workouts 95 (Institute for Law and 
Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law Sch., Research Paper No. 17-9, 2017), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2734&context=faculty_scholarship; 
William Bratton & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 66 (2004).  
 46.  This follows because “coercion” in restructuring proceedings is usually based on a finding of 
a breach of duty of good faith. See generally Bratton & Gulati, supra note 47. 
 47.  See generally Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are 
Retrofit Collective Action Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2012), 
http://www.hblr.org/?p=2283 (last visited Nov. 18, 2017). 
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foreign government carried out within its territory.”48 Creditors would most 
likely challenge this defense on the grounds that the Second Hickenlooper 
Amendment49 limits the application of the state action doctrine in 
expropriation claims and actually compels U.S. courts to make a 
determination by invoking international law. However, while this may 
appear to suggest that expropriation claims are in fact within the purview of 
U.S. courts, the Hickenlooper Amendment has been applied very narrowly 
because decisions affecting U.S. foreign relations are typically left to the 
purview of the executive branch.50 Granted, the defense of state action is 
used predominantly in U.S. court litigation. But if the expropriation claims 
are instead arbitrated, the defense would not carry the same weight in 
arbitration proceedings. 
Third, a justification for passing legislation that is grounded in “public 
necessity” gives Venezuela an affirmative defense against expropriation 
claims in both courts and arbitration tribunals. With a view to the disastrous 
potential consequences of default, Venezuela could claim that its actions 
were warranted out of public necessity, a consideration that often 
outweighs any sovereign’s duty to creditors. In mounting this defense in 
court proceedings, Venezuela would have to persuade a U.S. court to seek 
guidance from international tribunals.51 International courts have ruled, 
most recently in the case of the Greek restructuring decided by the 
European Court of Human Rights, that consideration of public necessity 
overrides duties to creditors in times of emergency.52 Granted, seeking 
guidance from international tribunals does not necessitate the same 
outcome by a U.S. court. But coupled with other factors (such as the 
tendency for U.S. courts not to question the domestic laws of foreign 
countries during times of emergency), we believe that a U.S. court holding 
may be consistent with international decisions. 
 
 48.  Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is bound to respect 
the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment 
on the acts of [a foreign government] done out within its own territory.”). 
 49.  22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012). 
 50.  See, e.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo S.A. v. Entex Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 
1982) (finding that the Hickenlooper Amendment was only intended to apply to cases involving claims 
of title to American-owned property nationalized by a foreign government in violation of international 
law).  
 51.  In resolving such disputes, U.S. courts are prone to rely on guidance from international law. 
See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding it 
“appropriate to look to international law” to determine if a certain action constitutes a taking).  
 52.  See, e.g., Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 26, 2001), 
18 ICSID REV. 160 (2003) (noting that the taking was justified because it occurred within the context 
of a broader financial crisis); Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016-Eur. Ct. H. R. 256. 
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Most importantly, even if all defenses fail and the bondholders are 
entitled to compensation, the typical remedy is for the bondholders to 
receive the fair market value of the expropriated property. The fair market 
value of most bonds in this case is already heavily discounted from their 
original value. Therefore, the small percentage of creditors who may 
choose to hold out and bring an expropriation claim would likely only get 
paid a fraction of the original value of the bonds. Ironically, holdouts who 
win an expropriation claim may end up receiving similar value for their 
bonds as bondholders who chose to exchange their bonds, especially if the 
new bonds’ value reflects the heavily discounted market value of existing 
bonds. 
3. Potential Challenges to Exit Consents 
If an exit consent strategy is used, and exchanging bondholders amend 
the “Guarantor” or place of payment, holdout creditors may argue that the 
amendments breached the contract terms and/or were unduly coercive, 
leaving them no meaningful choice but to exchange. We believe that in 
either case, changing these terms through exit consents would not be 
viewed by a court as a breach of the terms of the agreement nor as unduly 
coercive. This is supported by the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in 
Marblegate, where the court examined how exit consents interact with the 
Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) 316(b) language and held that contractual 
amendments impairing one’s ability to receive payment are permissible as 
long as they do not impair one’s right to receive payment.53 Here, changing 
the Guarantor or place of payment may affect one’s ability to receive the 
payment on time, but not one’s right. 
To make a determination of whether the amendments to the 
aforementioned terms were unduly coercive, a court may invoke the 
doctrine of the intercreditor duty of good faith. Case law is scattered when 
it comes to the application of good faith duties in restructuring contexts. A 
large part of it is found in 19th century cases, which are still good law and 
generally hold that bad faith actions are self-interested actions not in the 
 
 53.  See generally Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 
2017). While not governed by the statute per se, the language in PDVSA bonds strictly follows the TIA 
language stating in relevant part that “[o]ther amendments of, modifications to and supplements to the 
Indenture and the Notes may be made with the consent of the Holders of a majority in principal amount 
of the then Outstanding Notes issued under the Indenture, except that, without the consent of each 
Holder affected thereby, no amendment may . . . impair the right of each Holder to receive payment of 
principal of, premium, if any, interest and Additional Amounts, if any, on such Note on or after the due 
date thereof or to institute suit to enforce such payment.” Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% 
Due 2022, at 110–11. 
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best interests of the bondholders as a group. This would not include actions 
undertaken for self-preservation or otherwise for private gain.54 Here, the 
act of the majority of exiting creditors to amend certain terms arguably 
qualifies as an act of self-preservation that will benefit bondholders as a 
group by preventing a minority of creditors from holding out and getting a 
disproportionate amount of available resources. More importantly, in more 
recent U.S. cases, courts have given effect to a good faith duty only when it 
arises directly from the language of the contract,55 or when a party’s actions 
go against the reasonable expectations of the bondholders.56 The bond 
contracts here contain an exhaustive list that explicitly prohibits a variety of 
amendments without unanimous bondholder consent.57 The fact that 
amending the place of payment or the Guarantor is not explicitly prohibited 
means that such amendments via a qualified majority would fall within the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. As a result, a court is unlikely to find 
that such an amendment violates a good faith duty and is thus unduly 
coercive. 
IV. VENEZUELA’S EXTERNAL DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
We recommend that Venezuela use a similar strategy to restructure its 
own debt. As noted at the outset, the vast majority of the outstanding 
Venezuelan bonds contain pari passu provisions that may allow for the 
subordination of those bonds according to local law. The exact provision 
states: 
The Notes constitute Public External Indebtedness of the Republic and 
(subject to “Negative Pledge” below) are direct, unconditional, 
unsecured and general obligations of the Republic and shall at all times 
rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The 
payment obligations of the Republic under the Notes shall, save for such 
exceptions as may be provided by applicable legislation and subject to 
“Negative Pledge,” at all times rank at least equally with all its other 
payment obligations relating to External Public Debt . . . .58 
This provision exists in all CAC bonds (the post-2003 bonds). 
However, non-CAC (pre-2003) bonds do not contain the exact provision 
and make no reference to applicable law. Non-CAC debt stock is 
 
 54.  See Bratton & Levetin, supra, note 47, at 93; see also Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. 
Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1896). 
 55.  Katz v. Oak Industries, 508 A.2d 873, 880–81 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 56.  Kass v. Eastern Airlines, 1986 WL 13008, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1986), aff’d, 518 A.2d. 983 (Del. 
1986). 
 57.  Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022, at 110–11. 
 58.  Prospectus, Venezuela Global Bonds, 13.625% Due 2018, at 16 [hereinafter Venezuela CAC 
Bond]. 
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comprised of (1) a 1991-issued bond of $1.6 billion;59 (2) a 1997-issued 
bond of $4 billion60 and (3) a 1998 issue of $750 million. These bonds 
contain the following provision that makes no reference to “applicable 
legislation”: 
The Global Bonds will be direct, unsecured, general and unconditional 
obligations of Venezuela. The Global Bonds will rank pari passu, 
without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of 
Venezuela under the Global Bonds will at all times rank at least equally 
with all other payment obligations of Venezuela relating to External 
Public Debt.61 
Ideally, Venezuela would homogenize the debt by repurchasing the debt 
consisting of non-CAC bonds, especially if some issues are trading at a 
discount. But repurchasing debt would require sufficient liquid funds to 
cover the cost of the debt. Unless Venezuela could get emergency credit 
from outside creditors, it would be unlikely to have sufficient liquidity to 
engage in open market debt repurchasing. Thus, without outside credit, 
homogenizing the debt would be unlikely, and a restructuring plan would 
have to treat the two debt stocks differently. 
A. Restructuring CAC-Bonds 
1. First-Best Option: Legislative Subordination of Non-Exchanged 
Debt 
The payment obligations of the Republic under the notes shall rank 
pari passu with all other external indebtedness, “save for such exceptions 
as may be provided by applicable legislation.”62 This means that 
Venezuela can amend the “applicable legislation” to subordinate future 
non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt. As in the case of PDVSA debt, this 
subordination can be actual or potential; in other words, Venezuela could 
enact the legislation before an Exchange Offer, or threaten to enact the 
legislation in the course of the Exchange Offer. 
Using this subordination technique for the CAC-bonds is preferable to 
simply relying on the operation of the CAC or using exit consents, as both 
those techniques may prove ineffective. CAC bonds are not aggregated, 
which means that the 75% or 85% threshold for amending the payment 
terms has to be reached on a series-by-series basis. When the collective will 
of the bondholders is exercised on a series-by-series basis, however, 
 
 59.  Prospectus, Venezuela Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds, 6.75% Due 2020. 
 60.  Prospectus, Venezuela U.S. Dollar-Denominated Unsecured Global Bonds, 9.25% Due 2027 
 61.  Id. at 73. 
 62.  Venezuela CAC Bond, supra note 60.  
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financially powerful holdouts can block the application of a CAC by 
buying a sufficient amount of debt that makes them a supermajority 
debtholder. 
If triggering the CAC proves impossible, the most viable remaining 
option, absent the legislative subordination solution, would be to use exit 
consents. Exit consents in CAC bonds would require the issuer to convince 
at least 66.67% of bondholders to exchange their bonds and agree to amend 
non-payment terms in the old bonds before they exit. But there are at least 
two problems with using exit consents. First, powerful holdouts who can 
block the operation of the CAC may also buy a blocking position to prevent 
the use of exit consents. Second, even if holdouts do not acquire a blocking 
position, exit consents would, on their own, likely be insufficient to induce 
participation. To recall, an exit consent strategy only allows bondholders to 
amend certain Non-Reserved Matters (matters that are not reserved for 
amendment by the CAC majority). But CAC bonds simply include too 
many terms as “Reserved Matters” that are amendable only via a 
supermajority. These include changes in the governing law, jurisdiction, 
immunity, currency, and even place of payment, thus leaving little room for 
using exit consents effectively. 
Our proposed subordination technique mitigates these problems 
because it does not require convincing 66.67% or 75% of bondholders to 
exchange. In other words, a potential holdout is afraid of a 66.7% majority 
when confronted with the use of exit consents, and of a 75% or 85% 
majority when confronted with the use of a CAC. When confronted with 
the potential subordination of the bonds, however, the holdout is effectively 
afraid of even that 1% that may choose to exchange, which can come from 
any debt series. That is because it effectively only takes one bondholder to 
choose to exchange (and receive statutory priority) for the holdouts’ debt to 
be subordinated. As discussed previously in the context of PDVSA, this 
means that holdouts would have to purchase the entire debt to eliminate the 
risk of debt subordination. 
In the event that the subordination technique does not immediately 
induce 100% of bondholders to exchange – and even falls short of the 
Argentinian precedent of 93% participation – it is highly likely that it may 
still convince 75% or 85% of bondholders to exchange, triggering the 
CACs and binding all bondholders to the restructured payment terms. 
Therefore, while the CAC should not be the primary mechanism to 
restructure CAC bonds, we see that, if necessary, it could serve as a 
complementary mechanism to maximize participation. 
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Debt subordination here would only work if the term “applicable 
legislation” referred to Venezuelan law. Holdouts may argue that 
“applicable legislation” refers to New York rather than Venezuelan law, 
making the provision temporarily more ambiguous than the one in PDVSA 
bonds that explicitly refers to Venezuelan law. They would base their 
argument on the fact that New York law governs the contract, and hence 
that the term “applicable” refers to New York law. However, rules of 
contract interpretation, as well as common sense, weigh in favor of a 
finding that “applicable legislation” refers to Venezuelan, rather than New 
York, law. According to New York Courts, “it is a cardinal rule that a 
contract should not be read to render any provision superfluous,”63 and a 
contract interpretation “that has the effect of rendering at least one clause 
superfluous or meaningless is not preferred and will be avoided if 
possible.”64 The Second Circuit, in its contract interpretation of pari passu, 
also maintained “a contract should not be interpreted in such a way as 
would leave one of its provisions substantially without force or effect.”65 In 
this case New York law governs the contract, which means that all 
provisions of the contract are, by default, given effect according to New 
York law. The pari passu provisions would still be subject to New York 
legislation as a default rule under the contract. Therefore, it would be 
superfluous to include the provision “save for such exceptions as may be 
provided by applicable legislation”66 as a reference to New York law. 
Since contract provisions should not be interpreted in a way that they 
become superfluous, “applicable legislation” reasonably refers to 
Venezuelan, not New York, legislation. 
Additionally, evidence from Venezuela bond market pricing supports 
our position that the provision refers to Venezuelan law. If the initial 
hypothesis of an empirical test was that “applicable legislation” refers to 
Venezuelan law, then one would expect to see, as here, Venezuelan bonds 
that include the specific modified pari passu language valued less than 
Venezuelan bonds without the language (such as pre-2003 bonds). This is 
because the ability to successfully hold out is lower, and the possibility of 
non-payment greater, when the modified pari passu clause is present. 
 
 63.  Reyes v. Metromedia Software, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 64.  LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 65. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 66. Venezuela CAC Bond, supra note 60.  
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Indeed, a recent empirical paper on the pricing of Venezuelan bonds found 
the hypothesis to be true.67 
Finally, while holdouts could argue that the pari passu clause’s 
language is simply boilerplate or that Venezuela has misinterpreted it, their 
contention would not hold significant weight. For one thing, there is little 
room for misinterpretation. The clause clearly states that there can be 
legislative exceptions to the equal ranking of obligations guaranteed by 
pari passu. And, there is no reason to believe that exchanged debt cannot 
be identified as one such exception. It would also be difficult to argue that 
the clause’s modification is boilerplate language and not intended to be 
particularly meaningful, as pre-2003 bonds did not have any modifications 
from a typical clause, but post-2003 bonds did. As such, it becomes clear 
that Venezuela intentionally included the qualification or exception to pari 
passu in Venezuela’s bonds after 2003, intending for it to be contractually 
meaningful. 
2. Second-Best Option: Exit Consents Plus CACs 
Exit consents could be used, but only in conjunction with the CAC. In 
other words, neither a standalone use of the CAC nor exit consents would 
be enough to incentivize bondholders to participate in an exchange. Using 
exit consents and CACs conjunctively is riskier than the legislative 
subordination technique set forth above, as a court is more likely to view it 
as coercive. It also presupposes that bondholders would not be able to buy 
blocking positions. We explain here how it could work if we make that 
assumption. 
Venezuela would announce an Exchange Offer, under which holders 
of the old bonds would be encouraged to exchange them for new bonds. 
The payment terms of the new bonds would be altered to ensure a 
decreased NPV, by either cutting the principal amount, or extending the 
maturities and decreasing the interest rate. If, at the time of the proposed 
exchange, Venezuela deems it unlikely that 75% or 85% of bondholders 
will tender their bonds, the new bonds would include attractive terms 
(“carrots”) in the hopes of having at least 66.67% of bondholders – the 
minimum percentage of bondholders required for use of exit consents – 
accept the exchange.68 If 66.67% of bondholders decide to exchange, 
 
 67. While the difference in pricing may have also been a result of post-2003 bonds including 
CACs, the authors found that the pari passu provision also played a role in those bonds trading at a 
discount. See generally Elena Cartletti et al., Pricing Contract Terms in a Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds in 
2016, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 540 (2016). 
 68.  Possible “carrots” could include premium payments, oil warrants, or pari passu provisions 
that do not allow for legislative subordination.  
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Venezuela would then use an exit consent strategy so that those 
bondholders could amend the terms of the old bonds before they exchanged 
them (i.e. before they are no longer bondholders of the old bonds).69 In 
order to compel the additional 9% of bondholders needed to reach the 75% 
CAC threshold, bondholders would make the old bonds less attractive by 
amending the old bonds’ non-payment terms, such as Events of Default and 
Acceleration provisions.70 As a 75% supermajority, then, the exchanging 
bondholders would have to consent to amending the “Reserved Matters” of 
the old bonds, such as payment terms. In light of the outcome of a recent 
British case on exit consents,71 the bondholder supermajority would 
probably not extinguish the value of the old bonds. Instead, bondholders 
would likely agree to make the payment terms of the old bonds identical to 
the terms of the new bonds, effectively bypassing any significant coercion 
arguments. Hence, the bondholders who decided to holdout would be 
holding old bonds with identical NPV as the new bonds,72 as well as 
amended non-payment terms. Even if the holdouts would now own 100% 
of the old bonds post-exchange, no bondholder majority could re-amend 
the payment terms to increase the bond’s value. They may be able to re-
amend non-payment terms, but that would still leave them with bonds of 
the same (reduced) value as the new ones, minus the additional carrots that 
were included in the new offered bonds. As a result, it would be in their 
best interest to exchange rather than hold out. 
B. Restructuring Venezuelan Non-CAC Bonds 
Because the pre-2003 bonds do not include CACs and the bond 
provisions do not explicitly leave room for debt subordination by 
Venezuelan law, the best option for restructuring them is using a 
combination of “carrots” (incentives) and “sticks” (exit consents). 
 
 69.  The exiting bondholders will have to consent to amend the Bond themselves before they exit, 
as well as transfer power of attorney to the government to vote on their behalf when they are no longer 
able to vote. Contractually this seems possible. See Lee Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure 
Greek Debt 9 (Duke Law Sch., Working Paper No. 47, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304. 
 70.  These provisions define what events qualify as “default”, and whether a creditor can demand 
immediate payment at that time.  
 71.  See Assenagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch) 
(Eng.) (finding that using exit consents in conjunction with the functioning of CACs was excessively 
coercive when it virtually extinguished the value of non-exchanged bonds, far below their market 
value). 
 72.  In determining where to set the bonds NPV, bondholders can simply set it at the current 
market value of the bonds, which is already discounted compared to the bonds’ original value.  
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1. “Carrots”: Oil and GDP Warrants 
To incentivize bondholders to participate in the restructuring, we 
propose issuing bonds with oil and GDP warrants, which would allow 
bondholders to recover some of the bond value lost in the restructuring. 
Oil-linked bonds would guarantee payment to creditors if the oil market 
rebounds. Equivalently, GDP-linked bonds would yield higher returns for 
the bondholders throughout Venezuela’s broader economic recovery. GDP 
warrants can be particularly valuable to investors because Venezuela’s 
recovery will not only be a factor of rising oil prices, but will additionally 
depend on broader economic reforms. Therefore, coupling GDP and oil 
warrants ensures that creditors will adequately benefit from Venezuela’s 
future economic recovery. 
2. Exit Consents 
In addition to incentivizing creditors to exchange, Venezuela could 
use mechanisms to deter creditors from holding out, such as exit consents. 
While Venezuela’s CAC bonds contain provisions barring amendments to 
central provisions such as (i) the governing law, (ii) the ranking of the 
bonds (pari passu provision), and (iii) the waiver of immunity, the older 
non-CAC bonds do not include any such prohibitions; rather, they only 
prohibit amendments of payment terms and currency. Therefore, the non-
CAC bonds at issue here would allow a broader and thus more effective use 
of exit consents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Venezuela is confronting an unprecedented economic and financial 
crisis. A restructuring is inevitable, and will require an effective strategy to 
minimize costly litigation, improve debt sustainability, and free the 
Government to deal with other pressing economic and humanitarian issues 
facing the country. Given the heterogeneity of its debt stock, Venezuela’s 
debt restructuring may prove to be a particularly complex affair. Recently 
proposed restructuring strategies that rely on exit consents and Collective 
Action Clauses may prove insufficient to encourage large creditor 
participation in a restructuring. That is because those strategies leave room 
for powerful holdouts to buy blocking positions to preclude the use of those 
strategies altogether, and may also make it possible for them to seize 
PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s assets abroad. Instead of using exit consents 
and Collective Action Clauses as a sole or primary strategy, we believe that 
utilizing the pari passu provision in PDVSA and Venezuela bonds is the 
optimal option. Because the provision can be read to allow for 
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subordination of the bonds according to Venezuelan law, Venezuela can 
threaten the enactment of a law that subordinates non-exchanged debt to 
exchanged debt, thus making timely payment of holdout creditors unlikely. 
We believe fear of non-payment will compel creditors to join the Exchange 
Offer rather than hold out, especially because a New York court would 
likely find that using this technique is contractually permissible. This 
proposal is appealing because it only requires a handful of creditors of any 
debt series to exchange their bonds in order to subordinate all holdout debt. 
Thus, Venezuela would not be concerned with reaching higher pre-
determined thresholds of creditor participation to effectuate the 
restructuring. Further, since holdout debt would be subordinated, holdouts 
would not have a primary claim over Venezuela’s or PDVSA’s assets 
abroad, leaving those important assets available for payment of exchanging 
bondholders and other productive uses. 
 
